INTRODUCTION

It is unusual to write a paper relating to racism without including the word in the title. I have purposely avoided this because theoretical debates about definitional issues are abundant and often detract from the substantive issues. Banton (1970), Miles (1989) and Mason (1996) provide a thorough review of the conceptual and definitional issues surrounding the term ‘racism’. For the purpose of this paper I shall use the term ‘racism’ to mean the maltreatment of people because of their ‘otherness’ based on both cultural and biological assumptions of difference and inferiority (after Kovel, 1995). I will argue that structural explanations of racism, hatred and exclusion alone, are inadequate; social forces which exclude on a structural level are supported by affective and emotional mechanisms that operate on a conscious and unconscious plane. This paper is a discussion of how psychoanalytic concepts can add to sociological understanding of the mechanisms that generate and perpetuate racism and give rise to strategies of exclusion and inclusion within society.

I will commence with a brief examination of the work of Mary Douglas and Zygmunt Bauman in order to highlight the interrelation between structural and psychological forces before going on to discuss the critical theory of the Frankfurt school. The work of the school provides both an introduction to some of the basic concepts of psychoanalytic theory and a theoretical bridge between Freudian theory and the work of Melanie Klein. This provides a starting point for the consideration of a contemporary psychosocial theory of hatred and exclusion. I will then outline some of the major theoretical contributions of Melanie Klein and present them in a social relational context. Kleinian notions of ‘splitting’ and ‘projective identification’ enable us to understand the psychological mechanisms at work in a racist society from the perspective of both perpetrator and victim. Projective identification, a powerful mechanism of defence, involves the forcing of unpalatable parts of the self into some ‘other’ in a process that
becomes a lived experience, thus providing an insight into the way in which racism becomes internalized by the victim. Klein, I believe is one of the most important, if neglected theorists in this area. Klein provides an account of how drives, feelings and emotions are formed in the social environment giving a social psychodynamic interpretation of conflict. I will then argue for a synthesis of psychoanalytic and structural analysis within sociological analysis; a theoretical basis in explanation of the parallel construction of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds. Finally I will discuss some of the implications for the practical research environment and suggest a combination of sociological ethnographic research methods within a psychoanalytic schema of theoretical interpretation.

Mary Douglas and Zygmunt Bauman have both incorporated a psychosocial character into their work. Douglas argues in *Purity and Danger* (1966) that the boundaries of the body are symbolic of societal boundaries, a physicality that emphasizes difference to create order, and in doing so, excluding others in structures of discrimination. Ideas of ‘purification’ and ‘separateness’ function to impose order on an untidy system. The concept of ‘Pollution powers’ is an integral part of the structure of ideas. These powers punish the breaking of things that should be joined and the joining of things that should be separate. The notion of the polluting ‘other’ represents the stimulus which instigates the construction of boundaries. The fear associated with this psychosocial character is central to the way in which the structures of society are maintained and protected. Similarly, in Bauman’s concept of the ‘stranger’ (1990), we can see a psychosocial character who undermines order, sitting on the boundary, causing confusion and anxiety, becoming a target of hatred.

The work of Bauman and Douglas suggest the construction of a social boundary that excludes others in both a physical and psychological manner. The threat to the existing structure and order of ‘our’ ‘inside’, causes anxiety and fear, hatred is directed at those who threaten the existing order. In *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989), Bauman firmly places explanation of racism and hatred within a structural argument. Racism, for Bauman, is unthinkable without the structures of modernity: the nation state, rational scientific techniques, technology, and as such, racism is a strictly modern product (Bauman, 1989, p. 61). Modernity not only made racism possible but created a demand for it, a justification for boundary drawing and boundary guarding. The ‘stranger’ legitimizes the protection of boundaries within and around the nation state. Bauman discusses at length the structures of modern society that make the ubiquity of racism possible. Douglas suggests that the symbolism of the body, the polluting ‘other’ defines the boundaries and structures of society by its ‘otherness’. In some sense a clear distinction is drawn between the structural-rational and the psychological-irrational as if they were not interrelated concepts, yet in arguing a structural explanation, the role of the psychological is brought to the fore; the psychological internalization of a belief system based on the symbolic, on the imaginary, on the stranger. Psychological manifestations of fear caught and inextricably intertwined in the structures of society.

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It is now unthinkable to talk of others as biologically inferior, and the stress must be on the word talk, as biological inferiorization has given way to the language of difference. Reason for the hatred of others has shifted from the fear of difference (physically) to the fear of difference (psychologically). The emphasis is now expressed in terms of what Barker (1981) calls the New Racism. Difference legitimizes acts of inclusion and exclusion. Racism is no longer justified in terms of physicality but in terms of cultural difference in which the ‘other’ becomes ‘demonized’, a referent in a political project. Bauman’s psychosocial character, the ‘stranger’, becomes Anna-Marie Smith’s (1992) credible figure of ‘outsiderness’; a symbolic transformation into ‘otherness’ which Smith claims is crucial to a hegemonic political strategy. The threat from the ‘outsider’ legitimizes specific measures, for example, the intensification of ‘racially defined immigration policies’ (Smith, 1992, p. 32). Both Barker and Smith draw attention to the increasingly conscious bid by right wing politicians to organize people’s emotions, experiences and prejudices, reframing racial intolerance within a discourse of cultural difference. In this sense the black person becomes both ‘other’ and ‘inferior’. Rigid definitions become stereotypical and exclusionary defending a constructed social order by using psychological mechanisms to support structural facilitants of racism, hatred and exclusion. Structural explanations of racism offer us an insight into how, but are wholly inadequate in explaining why this type of behaviour occurs. The recognition of the role of unconscious processes at work in society can unlock the missing elements in the explanation of ethnic hatred, addressing the affective power in racism and confronting the irrational forces which inform social action.

PARANOID PROJECTION AND THE PERSECUTED ‘OTHER’

In Civilisation and its Discontents (1969) Sigmund Freud argues that it is ‘always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, as long as there are ‘other’ people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness’ (Freud, 1969, p. 51). Civilization is only made possible by the repression of drives and instincts which are sublimated or channelled into other activities such as the sciences and arts; ‘man’s’ inclination towards aggressiveness, an instinct repressed in civilization finds an outlet in hostility towards intruders, the ‘other’. Building on Freudian psychoanalytic theory the Frankfurt school and, perhaps most notably, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, arguably bridge the distinction between the structural-rational and psychological-irrational in a critical fusion of the work of Marx, Weber and Freud, laying a foundation for a psychosocial theory of racism and introducing some of the basic concepts of psychoanalytic theory.

In Dialectic of Enlightenment (1994), Horkheimer and Adorno argue that human consciousness is in some way brought about by a painful self-alienation from
our natural environment. Whereas animals react spontaneously without conscious reflection, human beings are alienated from this, from our natural behaviour, but our bodies are still programmed with drives, with ‘instinctual mechanisms’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1994, p. 180). Mimesis, a powerful instinctual mechanism for coping in the natural world, has been perverted in the modern world. In our natural environment we mimic in order to camouflage and blend in; ‘protection as fear in the form of mimicry’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1994, p. 180). In the modern world this has been perverted into the urge to control and dominate nature. Society both threatens and controls nature which ensures self preservation; instinctual mechanisms become sublimated in the practice of rational control of the modern environment. Although aimed in explanation at anti-Semitism, Horkheimer and Adorno demonstrate how the ‘other’ represents an obstacle to the integration of the administered rational world, minority groups that are perceived as threatening or dangerous become a target of hatred and exclusion. Jay (1994) sums up this stance: ‘the ultimate source of anti-semitism and its functional equivalents is the rage against the non-identical that characterizes the totalistic dominating impulse of western civilisation’ (Jay, 1994, p. 243).

Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of Horkheimer and Adorno’s use of psychoanalytic theory is the way in which they apply the notion of ‘projection’. We project on the world experiences and qualities that are part of ourselves, as if they are part of someone else. When the feeling is bad, the projection becomes paranoid: ‘what appears repellently alien is in fact all too familiar’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1994, p. 182). Anti-Semitism for Horkheimer and Adorno, is based on paranoid projection. Whereas the mimetic attempts to reconcile difference by blending in, by making the ‘inner’ world like the ‘outer’ world, accepting and embracing difference, the anti-Semite, the racist, attempts to change the environment, to make it like their ‘self’, intimate experiences are seen as hostile ‘impulses which the subject will not admit as his own even though they are most assuredly so, are attributed to the object – the prospective victim’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1994, p. 187). The product of paranoid projection is the stereotype, the transference of socially unpalatable thoughts from subject to object. The paranoic cannot accept his own instincts so he attacks others, experiencing his aggression as that of the ‘other’ and therefore perceiving others as threatening and dangerous. As Jay (1994) notes, all perception contains a projective element, a constructive and healthy projection maintains the tension between subject and object, neither one becoming reducible to the other. The ‘morbid’ element of anti-Semitism is its lack of self reflection: when the subject is no longer able to return to the object what s/he has received, Jean-Paul Sartre (1976) illustrates in Anti-Semitism and Jew this breakdown between subject and object when he talks of anti-Semitism as a passion. Experience does not produce the idea of the Jew, it is the projected stereotype of the Jew which produces the experience. This leads Sartre to conclude that ‘If the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him’ (Sartre, 1976, p. 13). In other words, experience is made reducible to the object, to the Jew.

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The work of the Frankfurt School has been highly criticized, the empirical work undertaken in the *Authoritarian Personality* (1950) criticized as ethnocentric, failing to explain at a sociological level. Bahr (1994) argues that the school has resorted to ‘far fetched’ theories applying ‘a naively realistic theory of perception’ (Bahr, 1994, p. 231). There are certain aspects of their work which are not clear and which make huge theoretical assumptions, for example, how the urge to dominate and control nature develops into the urge to dominate and control ‘others’. It is, however, quite plausible to take the projective elements of the theory without reference to nature, scrapping the biological determinism in Freud’s work and recognizing the potentiality of drives as something that is shaped by the social world. The Frankfurt School’s theory is crude but it provides a useful introduction to psychoanalytic thinking providing a foundation from which to develop a psychosocial perspective of racism and hatred. Elements of psychoanalytic thinking coupled with structural determinants give a clearer picture of the way in which affective and emotional mechanisms support and perpetuate acts of exclusion which in turn are shaped and moulded by the social.

**SPLITTING DIFFERENCE: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF ‘INNER’ AND ‘OUTER’ WORLDS**

Perhaps the most obvious problem with psychoanalysis for the sociologist is, that in drawing explanation from deep rooted drives and instinctual mechanisms, in other words, tensions that originate from within the body, the case in explanation of the racist, itself becomes racist and biologically determined; Freud’s notion of the origin of drives, turns us into some kind of ‘walking id’ (Kovel, 1995, p. 218). If, however, we recognize that drives are a potentiality which are shaped by the social world, situated in a relational context, then the work of Melanie Klein becomes particularly interesting in the context of sociological analysis.

What we understand to be solidarity, or communal solidarity, is by definition exclusionary. Strong feelings of togetherness, of solidarity create an ‘us’ and ‘them’ situation which can become destructive and lead to hatred. The maltreatment of other people because of their ‘otherness’ (racism) has become universal and embedded in the structure of both modern society and psyche. Difference is celebrated superficially at one level; on another, it is the subject of the loving preservation of ‘us’ and the malicious destruction of ‘them’. Rustin (1991) argues that beliefs in racial difference are among the most irrational that people hold. Drawing on the work of Klein, Rustin argues:

> the mechanisms of psychotic thought find in racial categorisation an ideal container. These mechanisms include the paranoid splitting of objects into loved and hated, the suffusion of thinking processes by intense, unrecognised emotion, confusion between the self and object...
due to the splitting of the self and massive projective identification, and hatred of reality of truth. (Rustin, 1991, p. 61)

The Kleinian account of civilization argues that humanity is the maker of its own misery, its own environment, through the projection of phantasy. It is a flaw in humanity, our fear, hatred and aggression, our need to separate, or split off and project into others, that makes our environment ‘inhospitable’ (Alford, 1989, p. 171). Klein (1988), unlike Freud, views the body as an expression, rather than a source of, drives. Drives, for Klein, are feelings, passions, emotions which are directed at others. In this sense, the language changes from a biological root, to an emphasis on social relationships; drives are therefore patterns of feelings which are directed at real or imaginary things: ‘the central conflict in human experience, for Klein, is between love and hate, between caring preservation and the malicious destruction of others’ (Alford, 1989, p. 26).

Klein argues in Love, Guilt and Reparation (1988), that from the earliest stages of life, under threat of phantasies of annihilation in which the self is in danger, good and bad are separated, and danger arises from lack of definition between the two (Klein, 1988, p. 435). The idea of a child developing through discreet and ordered states is, for Klein, too limiting. Rather, we develop certain clusters of attitudes and mechanisms that work together, describing the paranoid schizoid and depressive positions as ways of coping with anxiety. Klein’s notion of ‘positions’ differs from that of other developmental theorists in that she argues that we do not grow out of, or grow through these positions, but constantly move from one to the other. This is of particular interest in the explanation of hatred in that these positions are ‘likely to be used throughout life under any form of stress’ (Segal, 1992, p. 33). The paranoid schizoid position is the earliest form of organization of the defences: a young child’s fear takes the form of phantasies of persecution. In defence, the world is separated, split into good and bad objects. Initially, this anxiety stems from the social relationship between the infant and mother. In a process of introjection parts of others are taken into the self, they become ‘split’ and ‘idealized’. Perception becomes distorted, the ‘other’ is perceived as either excessively good or persecuting and dangerous. Segal (1992) notes that this idealization ‘covers a conviction that this other is really frightening and aggressive, diminishing the self, humiliating and destructive’ (Segal, 1992, p. 35). The good is introjected, the bad split off and projected into the object. The object then becomes, or is perceived as, dangerous and frightening. This is useful in the way in which we understand how hatred develops and thus leading to racism and exclusion.

Splitting leads to the formation of strong boundaries around the ‘self’. The ‘bad’, the ‘other’ is idealized, becoming larger than life, threatening and destructive. Exclusion and destructiveness ensue in defence of the ‘self’, against the ‘other’. The perceived threat becomes ‘demonized’ in society to the extent that no good can be seen: the stereotypical image develops of the Jew, the
Gypsy, the threat from black ‘otherness’. Phantasy itself develops a real threat to borders, ‘ways of life’; A distorted perception of ‘otherness in which things that belong together are separated in defence of the self. Black becomes a pure symbol of ‘otherness’, an embodiment of hate, destructiveness and danger, contained in the ‘inner world’ of phantasy and projected into the ‘outer’ world of society. Destructiveness is disowned by projecting it onto others. Anger is attributed to someone or something else; hating those we fear.

The crucial mechanism of defence for Klein (1946) is projective identification. Whereas projection is a relatively straight forward process in which we attribute our own affective state to others, for example, we may feel depressed and view our colleagues in the workplace as being ‘miserable’ or blame others for our mistakes, projective identification involves a deep split, a ridding of unpalatable parts of the ‘self’ into, rather than onto, someone else. Segal (1992) elucidates: ‘it can be used as a destructive attack, with nasty or unbearable or ‘mad’ parts of the self evoked in other people in order to destroy their comfort, their peace of mind or their happiness’ (Segal, 1992, p. 36). Projection per se may not be damaging as the recipient of paranoid thoughts may be blissfully unaware as such. Projective identification however involves a forcing of such a feeling into some other and therefore emotionally affecting the recipient. Bateman and Holmes (1995) emphasize the interactional and communicative aspects of projective identification: ‘if projective identification is seen as an interactive phenomena, then the recipient of the projection may be induced to feel or act in ways that originate with the projector’ (Bateman and Holmes, 1995, p. 84). This may lead to feelings of inadequacy or low self esteem in the recipient, feelings that originate in the mind of the projector. Frantz Fanon (1968) gives a powerful example of how projective identification becomes a lived experience for the victim in Black Skin White Masks:

I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. I subjected myself to objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave ships. . . (Fanon, 1968, p. 112).

Fanon describes being imprisoned in a world constructed by white men. Living and experiencing a projected identification that is so intense that racism is introjected and internalized. Fanon argues that black identity has been so powerfully constructed by white culture that the black person adopts a ‘white man’s attitude’. In order to cope with this alienated sense of self he has to see himself as an object, to decouple himself from his emotions. This for Fanon is intolerable; ‘I rejected all immunisation of the emotions’ (Fanon, 1968, p. 113). Fanon copes with this identification by firstly recognizing it and secondly re-asserting his identity as a black man: ‘since the other hesitated to recognise me, there remained only one solution: to make myself known’ (Fanon, 1968, p. 115).
Bion (1962) builds on Klein’s notion of projective identification introducing the concept of ‘container’ and ‘contained’; the recipient of projection acts as a container of feelings, such as fear, hatred and anxiety. Pressure is exerted, ‘unconsciously designed to coerce the recipient into experiencing himself and behaving in a way that is congruent with the unconscious projective phantasy’ (Ogden, 1990, p. 145). The object of the projection becomes inferior, repellent, a container with which to detoxify our own self, something to be excluded and persecuted. Rustin (1991) cites by example Seabrook’s (1973) account of racism in Blackburn in the 1960’s illustrating the psychodynamic between perpetrator and victim. As parts of the Asian community start to take on some of the characteristics of white working class life, the white community, simultaneously, through economic decline and social integration, experience a loss of these qualities. The white community project onto the Asian community the ‘demoralized’ and ‘disintegrated’ state which they are experiencing, in the form of hostility toward the lifestyle adopted by the Asian community. Seabrook’s study emphasized the notion that the ‘other’ can possess qualities stolen from the self. Zizek (1993) develops this psychoanalytic notion into a theory of nationalism and national identification.

Zizek argues that through phantasy we have developed a ‘national thing’ only accessible to ‘us’ and not to ‘others’. Ethnic tension arises over ownership and possession of this ‘thing’; the ‘other’, who does not possess this ‘thing’ wants to steal our enjoyment by ruining our way of life. This is the paradox of the confusion of perception in the paranoid schizoid position, we fear the theft of our own enjoyment while believing that ‘others’ organize their enjoyment in a peculiar way (Zizek, 1993, p. 203). Arguably the root of racism must therefore be the hatred of our own enjoyment. If the ‘other’ is a psychological manifestation which is within us, then this hatred is also our own. We imagine the ‘other’, while imagining what we have imagined has stolen something from us. It is the paradoxical nature of the paranoid schizoid position which can account for the projective elements of situations whereby a country can open its arms to people in a post-war boom, to do all manner of jobs, yet the ‘other’ is perceived as stealing ‘our’ jobs, jobs which nobody wanted to do in the first place—the theft of something we never possessed. Projective identification involves a deep and paradoxical split in which unpalatable parts of the self are projected into something or someone else, a construction of the ‘other’ as a form of defence. The ‘other’ is then responsible for the theft of our enjoyment, something we have imagined in phantasy and never possessed.

The Kleinian account of projection and projective identification gives a far more useful account of how drives, feelings, emotions are formed in the social environment, avoiding the theoretical leaps of Freudian theory and providing a basis for the interpretation of conflict. Kleinian theory helps us understand the psychodynamics that operate between victim and perpetrator in explanation of racism, hatred and exclusion. As this interpretation is based in the social it is
easier to see, as Alford (1989) notes, how larger groups can perpetuate anxiety about the ‘other’. Solidarity and community can be destructive in that they re-enforce paranoid schizoid anxiety by giving it an objective focus. For example, white racism focuses on Black, Asian or Jew; capitalism on communism, legitimating and re-enforcing anxiety. The individual in the group is made less anxious in that everybody is having the same phantasy although attained at the cost of personal growth: ‘safety before growth’ (Alford, 1989, p. 44).

Frosh (1989) describes the paranoid schizoid position as essentially about the attempt to organize the chaotic contents of the psyche and suggests that it is ‘fundamental to processes of ordinary thought and discrimination’ (Frosh, 1989, p. 122). It is excessive anxiety that causes the splitting to go awry. Klein is not specific about what type or level of anxiety can cause splitting to be destructive: we can only speculate. What Klein is quite clear about however, is that the paranoid schizoid position is not a developmental stage that we pass through. It is, for Klein, a position that we can return to at any stage of our life and is likely to be used under stress or anxiety.

If the paranoid schizoid position is characterized by the splitting of difference, then arguably the ‘depressive position’ can be described as a reconciliation of difference. Klein (1988) identifies this as an integration of experience, rather than a split; a perception of persons, containing both good and bad. ‘It involves not only a reduced need to split and project and an increased integration of good and bad objects, but also a move from perceiving a part-object to perceiving a whole object’ (Craib, 1989, p. 148). Conflicts within the self are no longer split and pushed into others, recognition of both good and bad within the self allows recognition of this in others. The depressive position can be viewed as a recognition of the plurality of difference, in which the individual hates the hating self and tries to repair, to make reparation for the damage that has been done. Care for others develops, as does guilt, in realization that the attacked ‘other’ contains good as well as bad. Bird (1994) argues that the problem with many psychoanalytic accounts of racism, is the difficulty in explaining the conditions in which the schizoid position arises. It could be suggested however, that Kleinian theory itself holds the answer.

The depressive position involves fear and great anxiety about the ability to make reparation for those destroyed in phantasy: in attempting to restore the destroyed object, the anxiety generated may be so great that it leads to the employment of paranoid schizoid defences. In the explanation of racism, anxiety is not created by acceptance and celebration of difference. Rather, it is the doubt on the part of the individual of his ability to do so, to make reparation, which leads to the employment of schizoid defences. Let us take a hypothetical example: ‘I am sorry that I have hurt you, I want to be your friend, accept you and love you, but I doubt my ability to do so, to make the situation good again. If you are bad, if I form a border, a boundary to stop you coming in, I need not confront my own guilt or anxiety.’ Thus the urge to make reparation, in...
itself, perpetuates and justifies racism for the racist. This we can see in the ‘double bind’ of the ‘new racism’: ‘we’ the British nation are tolerant, ‘we’ open our arms to you, but in doing so the ‘we’ marginalizes ‘you’. ‘You’ cannot be like ‘us’ because you are not like ‘us’. We make reparation to you, but in doing so we are unable to cope with the anxiety that we feel, the guilt of treating you the way we have. Intolerance, as Bauman (1991) so lucidly comments, hides under a mask of toleration.

Envy, which seeks to destroy, is part of the affective account of the explanation and interrelation between structural and psychological facilitants of hatred. Envy for Klein, as Craib (1989) notes, is entirely destructive. Klein (1957) makes a clear distinction between envy, jealousy and greed. Jealousy excludes another from good; destructiveness is a by-product of exclusion. Greed operates similarly, by taking the whole of the good, regardless of any consequences others may suffer, and again destructiveness is a by-product. Envy, however, ‘seeks to destroy the good itself’ (Alford, 1989, p. 37). Envy is associated with anxiety in that envy and anxiety stand as a barrier to the reconciliation of good and bad in the depressive position. Arguably, envy compounds the anxiety associated with reparation in the depressive position. We perceive others as possessing something good that has been stolen from us: jobs, cultures, ways of life. We try to take it back, but we cannot have it all back, so we cleanse it by destroying it. In seeking to ethnically cleanse ‘others’, we are in fact cleansing ourselves, ridding ourselves of the discomfort of envy. The racist in envy, seeks to destroy the good that he cannot have. If he cannot have it then nor can anyone else. Thus hostility and racism erupt from both structural impediments; for example, changes in employment and work patterns, and psychosocial factors in which the racist seeks to return to an imaginary way of life stolen by others. The racist, unable to enjoy cultural difference is a manifestation of envy; making bad what is good and destroying what he cannot have because he is unable to accept and share.

We seek to destroy the ‘other’ in the schizoid position as a defence in times of anxiety. This anxiety may stem from warfare, the heightening of ethnic tension, economic depression or even simply living together as a community, and may be compounded by envy. Paradoxically this anxiety may be produced in some people by the very act of making reparation in the depressive position, thus invoking schizoid defences in a vicious spiral of racism. In other words, emotions and feelings that are formed in the process of social interaction and are deemed to be good or at least are seen to be making good, support structures of exclusion, building borders and boundaries. To form a boundary releases the individual from the guilt and anxiety produced by their treatment of others. As life and the structure of society changes we seek to hold onto that which has gone and the racist seeks to take back what s/he perceives others have stolen. In this way both structural and affective forces work together to reproduce and support strategies for dealing with cultural difference which entail acts of racism, hatred and exclusion.
This paper thus far has been largely theoretical seeking to integrate and synthesize psychoanalytic and structural notions of exclusion within a common theoretical framework. Psychoanalysis, as Craib (1989) suggests, deals with the irrational; love, hate, forces that shape motivation in everyday existence drawing attention to the massive substantive irrationality that has accompanied modernity. The psychosocial method examines both structural and psychological factors at work in the generation of hostility. In Seabrook’s (1973) study we see how structural factors such as economic decline, unemployment and re-employment led to hostility between white and Asian communities in Blackburn. These structural changes were linked to notions of anxiety. As the structure of society changes, it evokes anxiety, feelings of the loss of a ‘way of life’, changing the way in which we perceive others. The tension between structure, the ‘outer’ world, and the ‘inner’ world of the psyche are examined in parallel.

How can we relate this to the practical research environment? Hunt (1989) suggests that subjectivity and self understanding are critical to well executed fieldwork, suggesting a synthesis of ethnographic methods which incorporate psychoanalytic tools of interpretation. Psychoanalytic practice in fieldwork is important in that it contributes to our understanding of how sociological data is both structured and constructed. There are two main areas in which psychoanalytic ethnography differs from conventional fieldwork. Firstly, there is the notion that the unconscious plays a role in the construction of our reality and the way in which we perceive others. This is the theoretical framework on which we base the analysis of our research findings. Secondly, the role of the unconscious plays a significant part in both the generation of research data and the construction of the research environment, thus recognizing and using ethnography as a social activity. Sherwood (1980), to illustrate with a practical example, uses a series of unstructured life history interviews to explore the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds of multiracial areas. The subjects, all from different ethnic backgrounds, are researched in a cultural, social and historical context, yielding information on a conscious surface level to provide insights into unconscious ‘motivations and defences’ (Sherwood, 1980, p. 13). This methodology considers psychological, sociological and cultural aspects of our lives as interdependent and, as such, each has an influence on the other in the way in which we construct social life through relationships, feelings and action. Innis (1998) also reflects on the usefulness of psychoanalytic concepts as a social worker involved in a mental health after-care hostel:

These accounts enable me to think of racist and other responses to the experience of difference as originating not only in historical, political and social reality but also in the unconscious internal conflicts of the individual (Innes, 1998, p. 187)
Similarly, Joffe (1996) proposes a psychodynamic extension to social representational theory using empirically derived research data to demonstrate the explanatory power of psychoanalytic concepts such as splitting and projection. The emphasis is therefore on a hermeneutic interpretive methods which recognise both conscious and unconscious cultural meanings. The interpretive is mediated by the minds of both researcher and researched, adding another explanatory dimension in the field of ethnography. Thus we have a three-fold argument for the synthesis of methodologies. Firstly, structural explanation is able to explain how, but not why certain social phenomena occur. Psychoanalysis addresses this deficiency by recognizing the role of the unconscious mind in the construction of social realities; with its suggesting that feelings and emotions shape our perception and motivation, constructing the way in which we perceive others. Secondly, the psychoanalytic method recognizes the role of the researcher in the interpretation of realities and the way in which unconscious forces shape the research environment. Finally, there is an integration of social, cultural and historical factors at a conscious level which yields information about unconscious motivations and defences. This combination of sociological ethnographic research methods and psychoanalytic interpretive theory is particularly enlightening where traditional methods have failed to explain phenomena satisfactorily, as is the case in the research of hatred and exclusion.

CONCLUSION

Psychoanalytic theory offers the social scientist a new array of tools in the explanation of social phenomena. Notions of ‘splitting’, ‘projection’ and ‘projective identification’ open up new insights into the way in which social interaction can lead to exclusionary practices. It is not a wholly new concept to try and weave together certain aspects of the ‘internal’ world of the psyche into sociological analysis. Marx (1977) talks of the ‘essence’, the ‘species being’ of the worker. Similarly, Weber (1993) argues that the psychological internalization of a way of thinking, ‘worldly asceticism’ provides a decisive impetus to the development of the economic and social structure of western civilisation. In a sense this paper has been inspired by the intimation of these early writers and attempts to build on them to develop a psychosocial interpretation of racism, hatred and exclusion.

Racism and exclusion operate at a macro social level and on an individual affective plane. In order that we may understand these phenomena we need to analyse the dynamic between social forces that exclude at a structural level and the affective emotional mechanisms that emanate from within the individual. I have attempted to show how seemingly structural explanations of phenomena often result in the inclusion of some form of psychological mechanism, or what I have termed as a psychosocial character, to give credence to the development...
of structural impediments in the form of borders, boundaries and exclusionary practices. Some of the basic ideas of psychoanalytic theory have been introduced through the work of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno which, although based on a crude Freudian model, provide an insight into the notion of ‘projection’. The work of Klein is more useful in that her analysis is situated in a relational context. Drives are a potentiality that are shaped by social interaction with others. Splitting, as a way of coping with anxiety leads to the formation of strong barriers around the self, there is a clear distinction between good and bad in which the other becomes idealized, larger than life, threatening and destructive. This concept, as I have agreed, is useful in the understanding of how hatred develops as fear, fear of otherness. The crucial defensive mechanism in the paranoid schizoid position is projective identification which reinforces paranoid anxiety. Projection per se may have no affect on individuals or groups, indeed they may be blissfully unaware of the process, projective identification, however, involves the forcing of paranoid phantasy into, rather than onto, some other. The implication of this is that as an interactive phenomenon, the recipient of the projection may feel or act in ways that originate in the projector; projective identification therefore becomes a lived experience. The object of the projection becomes inferior, repellent, a container with which we detoxify our own feelings, someone or some group to be excluded and persecuted.

I have described the depressive position as that of a reconciliation of difference, in which recognition of both good and bad within the self allows a similar perception of others. Paradoxically, guilt and the urge to make reparation for the damage done to others can cause a level of anxiety which may trigger paranoid schizoid defences. In searching for an explanation for racism it would seem that anxiety is created not by the acceptance and celebration of difference but by the doubt on the part of the individual of his ability to do so. I have argued that envy also stands as a barrier to the reconciliation of good and bad in the depressive position, compounding the anxiety associated with reparation. Envy points to the lack of the racist’s ability to understand and share with others leading to envy not only excluding but also destroying. This suggests that to build a boundary or to form a border releases the individual from the guilt and anxiety produced by their treatment of others. As Rustin (1991) observes, ‘racism as a system of distortions and lies, can be successfully fought only through a commitment to the truth, concerning both inner and outer realities’ (Rustin, 1991, p. 82). I have suggested that a hermeneutic interpretive method which recognizes both conscious and unconscious cultural meanings within the traditional fieldwork environment would add another explanatory dimension to traditional ethnography. The combination of sociological ethnographic research methods and psychoanalytic interpretive theory allows us to look in parallel at how changing structures in society evoke certain emotions and anxieties. These powerful affective forces in turn support structures of discrimination, produce exclusionary practices and together lead to the maltreatment of people because of their ‘otherness’.
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NOTES

1 The spelling Ph denotes that the process is unconscious. Phantasy for Klein, as Mitchell (1986) notes, emanates from within and imagines what is without, linking feelings to objects and producing a world of imagination. The external world can modify the hypothesis that phantasy sets out. Phantasy is therefore both the activity and the product.

2 Gomez (1997) notes that as a non-scientist Klein felt no need to work within a Freudian biological framework. Klein was interested in experience, in subjective interpretation, rather than objective scientific facts.

REFERENCES


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